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Abstract 
Research suggests that animals’ capacity for agency, experience, and benevolence predict beliefs about 
their moral treatment. Four studies built on this work by examining how fine-grained information about 
animals’ traits and behaviours (e.g., can store food for later vs. can use tools) shifted moral beliefs about 
eating and harming animals. The information that most strongly affected moral beliefs was related to 
secondary emotions (e.g., can feel nostalgia), morality (e.g., will share food with others), empathy (e.g., 
can feel others pain), social connections (e.g., will look for deceased family members), and moral 
patiency (e.g., can feel pain). In addition, information affected moral judgements in line with how it 
affected superordinate representations about animals’ capacity for experience/feeling but not 
agency/thinking. The results provide a fine-grained outline of how, and why, information about animals’ 
traits and behaviours informs moral judgements.  
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When is it wrong to eat animals? The relevance of different animal traits and behaviours 
 
If you had five chickens could you tell them apart by just the way they acted? Or would they all just be walking 
around? Cluck, cluck, cluck? Because if they have individual personalities I don’t think we should be eating them. 
- George Costanza, Seinfeld 
Research has begun to document why some animals are deemed worthy of moral concern and 
others are not (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017; Dhont & Hodson, 2019; Possidónio, Graça, Piazza, & Prada, 
2019). However, we still have a relatively coarse-grained understanding of how information is likely to 
shift moral beliefs about animals. As articulated by George Costanza, idiosyncratic and fine-grained 
information (e.g., this animal has a personality) may bear on how we view the moral treatment of 
animals. To investigate this, we tested how a wide range of fine-grained information about animals’ 
traits and behaviours affected moral judgements related to meat eating. We also captured how this 
information affected beliefs about animals’ capacity for agency/thinking and experience/feeling. We 
then integrated these data with an established perspective on mind perception (H. M. Gray et al., 2007) 
by examining whether the relative moral importance of each trait and behaviour was driven by the 
degree to which it reflects a capacity for agency/thinking and experience/feeling.  
Which animals are wrong to eat? 
People make moral distinctions between animals on the basis of several factors. Seminal work 
highlights the importance of animals’ perceived mental sophistication and, more specifically, their 
capacity for experience and agency (Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012; H. M. Gray et al., 2007). 
Experience and agency arise from judgements about the extent to which animals possess several mental 
capacities. Statistical analyses reveal that judgements about the extent to which animals have mental 
capacities related to emotions and feelings (e.g., anger, pleasure) and thinking and reasoning cohere 
(e.g., using tools, communicating; H. M. Gray et al., 2007). This suggests that judgements about animal 
minds can be organized along two superordinate dimensions (but see also Piazza et al., 2014 and 
Weisman, Dweck, & Markman, 2017). Broadly construed, experience reflects the capacity for feeling and 
consciousness, whilst agency reflects the capacity for thinking and intelligence. These dimensions 
subsequently predict beliefs about the morality of eating and harming animals (Bastian et al., 2012; H. 
M. Gray et al., 2007; Possidónio et al., 2019).  
Work done in parallel finds that people differentiate between animals along other dimensions. 
People are more concerned with the welfare of benevolent compared to harmful animals (Study 1, 
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(Piazza, McLatchie & Olesen, 2018) are held in higher regard than those that are not. Lastly, people are 
less concerned with the suffering of animals that are culturally defined as sources of food (Loughnan, 
Haslam, & Bastian, 2010). Taken together, these data capture why some animals are afforded greater 
moral concern than others. However, these data do not capture how, and why, new information about 
animals shifts moral concern. 
How does new information shift beliefs about which animals are wrong to eat? 
A wealth of information exists about animals that could potentially bear on moral judgements. 
In this paper, we use the term ‘characteristic’ to refer to animals’ latent traits (e.g., is capable of 
planning) and observable behaviour (e.g., will hide food for later). People seem to be sensitive to new 
information about animals’ characteristics. For example, those who are familiar with animals, or interact 
with them on a regular basis, hold them in higher regard (McConnell, Brown, Shoda, Stayton, & Martin, 
2011; Possidónio et al., 2019); perhaps because they have first-hand experience of animals’ traits and 
behaviours (Maust-Mohl, Fraser, & Morrison, 2012). More controlled studies find corroborating results. 
Ascribing animals’ several characteristics associated with the capacity for experience/feeling or 
agency/thinking causes people to be more reluctant to harm and eat them (Piazza et al., 2014; Piazza & 
Loughnan, 2016; Sytsma & Machery, 2012). Other work demonstrates that ascribing animals’ several 
characteristics associated with benevolence prompts people to be more concerned with their welfare 
(Piazza, et al., 2014). This finding aligns with broader perspectives on the relevance of social and moral 
capacities (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Taken together, the work shows that moral beliefs are sensitive 
to new information about animals’ capacity for experience (e.g., are capable of pain and rich emotions), 
agency (e.g., are capable of problem solving and tool use) and benevolence (e.g., are gentle and 
peaceful).  
These data provide a useful picture of how new information about animals’ shifts moral beliefs. 
However, it is worthwhile to examine more fine-grained information. This is because important 
distinctions could exist between characteristics that are not captured by the present literature. As an 
example: the capacity to use tools and the capacity to plan are subsumed by the superordinate category 
of agency but might evoke different amounts of moral concern. Theoretical perspectives suggest that 
such distinctions may exist. Complex human-like states (e.g., nostalgia) ought to evoke greater moral 
concern than simple animal-like states (e.g., anger; Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2001). Likewise, 
negative feelings (e.g., pain) should confer greater moral standing than positive feelings (e.g., pleasure; 
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superordinate category of experience. These findings suggest that it could be fruitful to examine how 
fine-grained information about animal characteristics affects moral beliefs. 
Present research 
Current perspectives capture how new information about animals’ experience, agency, and 
benevolence shifts moral judgements. However, less work has gone beyond experience, agency, and 
benevolence to examine how fine-grained information confers moral standing in animals. It is important 
to examine how different information affects moral beliefs, given that such information features in 
popular scientific communications (e.g., de Waal, 2016) and is likely to affect how we treat animals 
(Dhont & Hodson, 2019; Joy, 2010; Ruby, 2012). As such, we test how a large set of fine-grained 
information about animals’ latent traits and observable behaviours shifts beliefs about the moral 
treatment of animals.  
We present four studies examining how moral judgements shift in response to information 
about whether animals have and lack different characteristics. We measure moral beliefs in terms of 
meat eating, but also in terms of judgements related to harm, as these are salient moral concerns 
related to human-animal relations (e.g., Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). Furthermore, we examine if the 
effects are moderated by the cultural status of the animal (i.e., whether the animal is typically reared for 
food). This is because people represent and process information pertaining to food animals in a 
motivated fashion (Bastian et al., 2012; Bratanova et al., 2011; Loughnan et al., 2010). Finally, we 
examine if superordinate representations of experience/feeling and agency/thinking (H. M. Gray et al., 
2007) might account for why some characteristics are more morally relevant than others. As previously 
mentioned, ascribing animals different characteristics shifts beliefs about the animals’ capacity for 
agency and experience (Piazza et al., 2014; Piazza & Loughnan, 2016), which then feed into the moral 
distinctions people make between animals (H. M. Gray et al., 2007; Piazza et al., 2014; Piazza & 
Loughnan, 2016; Sytsma & Machery, 2012). This suggests that superordinate representations about the 
capacity for experience and agency might account for why some characteristics afford greater moral 
standing than others.  
We posit several predictions. First, we expect mental sophistication to elevate moral concern. 
That is, animals that are described as having mental characteristics will be more wrong to eat and harm 
compared to animals that are described as lacking mental characteristics. We also expect some 
characteristics to be stronger drivers of moral judgements than others. Specifically, we expect 
characteristics related to experience (H. M. Gray et al., 2007), socio-morality (Piazza et al., 2014; Haslam 
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patiency (K. Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012) to most strongly affect moral judgements. Finally, following 
prior work, we expect the moral relevance of each characteristic to be related to perceptions of 
experience and agency (H. M. Gray et al., 2007; Sytsma & Machery, 2012). We present four studies 
testing these predictions. 1 The data, stimulus materials, and analysis scripts are available online 
(osf.io/4t2mg/?view_only=01183bb932524067a778dade7f1507f6). 
Studies 1a & 1b 
Studies 1a and 1b document how people perceive a range of characteristics in terms of their 
relevance for moral judgements related to meat eating. Studies 1a and 1b examine how people perceive 
animals for which they have no prior knowledge and therefore have no obvious cultural significance. We 
examine a range of characteristics (i = 16) that capture important traits associated with animal minds.  
Participants & Design 
Samples. Study 1a comprised two hundred and forty-one students (211 female; Mage = 19.12, SD 
= 2.43) from a British University participated in exchange for course credit. Participants identified their 
diet as follows: omnivore (n = 194), pescatarian (n = 14), vegetarian (n = 26) and vegan (n = 7).  Study 1b 
comprised two hundred and thirteen students (179 female; Mage = 19.84, SD = 3.93) from a British 
University participated in exchange for course credit. Participants identified their diet as follows: 
omnivore (n = 180), pescetarian (n = 11), vegetarian (n = 15) and vegan (n = 7). 
Statistical power. A sensitivity analysis conducted via G*Power (nStudy1a = 241, nStudy1b = 213; α = 
.05; two-tailed) suggested that both samples afforded greater than 80% power to detect a small-to-
medium main effect (ηp
2
have-lack = .03) and two-way interaction (ηp
2
have-lack x characteristic
 = .01). 
Design. Both studies followed a 2 (have vs. lack) × 16 (characteristic) mixed design. Participants 
were randomly assigned to read about animals that had or lacked characteristics (between-participants). 
Participants were presented with 16 different animals, each described in terms of a single characteristic 
(within-participants). The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and 
approved by an internal ethical review board in compliance with British Psychological Society’s code of 
ethics and conduct. All participants provided informed consent prior to participation. 
                                                        
1 An additional study (Study S1) examined how a small set of characteristics (i = 4) shifted moral judgements in real 
food animals and fictitious neutral animals. In contrast to Studies 1-3, we found no evidence that judgements 
differed across characteristics. These results may be due to differences in the judgement contexts of Studies 1-3 
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Procedure and Materials 
The experimental procedure was largely identical in Studies 1a and 1b. Participants read 16 
excerpts capturing mental characteristics described in studies on animal cognition (de Waal, 2016; 
Shettleworth, 2001) and psychological theory (Demoulin et al., 2004; H. M. Gray et al., 2007; Haslam & 
Loughnan, 2014), including: empathy (e.g., feeling what others feel), morality (e.g., cooperation, 
fairness, benevolence), primary positive emotions (e.g., pleasure), primary negative emotions (e.g., 
pain), secondary positive emotions (e.g., awe), secondary negative emotions (e.g., shame), social 
connections (e.g., seeking comfort with others), social recognition (e.g., recognizing self and others), 
object recognition (e.g., classifying images), learning (e.g., learning commands), theory of mind (e.g., 
following other’s gaze), planning (e.g., hiding food for later), communication (e.g., warning others of 
predators), tool use (e.g., using rocks to break nuts), spatial reasoning (e.g., remembering location of 
food), and play (e.g., chasing balls). Full descriptions of the characteristics are presented in Table S1. 
Participants were either presented with animals that had (e.g., “…is capable of spatial reasoning…”) or 
lacked (e.g., “…is not capable of spatial reasoning…”) characteristics. To minimize effects of prior 
knowledge, participants were asked to imagine fictitious animals (e.g., trablans; Piazza et al., 2014; 
Sytsma & Machery, 2012). Following each characteristic, participants judged the extent to which the 
animal had the capacity for eight mental states (thought, self-control, planning, remembering, fear, 
pain, pleasure, suffering). Participants then judged, on a two-item measure, how morally wrong it would 
be to eat the animal and how guilty they would feel to eat the animal. Responses were provided on a 
relative scale in Study 1a, from -3 (much less than a typical animal) to +3 (much greater than a typical 
animal); and an absolute scale in Study 1b, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Study 1a adopted a 
relative scale to maximize differences across characteristics. Study 1b adopted an absolute scale to 
ensure the results replicate with more typical measurement instruments. 
Results and Discussion 
Data Preparation 
We aggregated measures of moral wrongness and guilt within each characteristic (αs > .68). We 
then conducted a factor analysis within each characteristic on the eight mental states terms (thought, 
self-control, planning, remembering, pain, pleasure, suffering, fear) extracting two factors via a 
maximum likelihood method with promax rotation. The two factors accounted for 60-85% and 7-23% of 
the variance, respectively, and differentially loaded on items related to agency (thought, self-control, 
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= .44 - .81). We calculated composite scores for agency (αs >  .90) and experience (αs > .82). Further 
descriptive statistics can be found in Tables S3 and S4. 
Main Analysis 
We conducted an Analysis of Variance with 2 (have vs. lack) × 16 (characteristic) on moral 
judgements, perceptions of agency, and perceptions of experience. Including diet (omnivore vs. 
pescatarian vs. vegetarian vs. vegan) in these models did not qualify any of the central effects, Fs < 2.09, 
ps > .102.2 As such, we do not consider this factor any further. The results from Studies 1a and 1b were 
largely identical. Looking first at moral judgements, animals that had characteristics were less 
permissible to eat than those that lacked characteristics (Study 1a: F(1, 239) = 169.61, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .42; 
Study 1b: F(1, 211) = 46.55, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .18). Importantly though, some characteristics more strongly 
affected moral judgements compared to others (Study 1a: F(13.18, 3149.58) = 10.76, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .04; 
Study 1b: F(11.59, 2445.45) = 6.30, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .03). We explored these effects further by examining 
the differences for each characteristic (lack vs. have). These differences provide an index of the 
importance of each characteristic for each judgement, with large scores reflecting a strong effect of a 
characteristic on judgements, whereas small scores reflect a small effect. For brevity, we only plot the 
results from Study 1a. Figure 1 shows that empathy, morality, secondary and primary negative 
emotions, and social connections shifted moral judgements the most; whilst play, spatial reasoning, and 
tool use shifted moral judgements the least. 
                                                        
2 These models also revealed few main effects of diet, Fs < 1.63, ps > .182, bar an effect on moral judgement in 
Study 1b (Momnivore = 3.98, Mpescatarian = 5.56, Mvegetarian = 5.76, Mvegan = 6.70), F(3, 205) = 18.69, p < .001, ηp
2
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Figure 1. Wrongness/guilt associated with eating an animal that lacks (-) and has (+) each characteristic 
in Study 1a. Characteristics are organized from most to least impactful. Figure shows the 95% bootstrap 
confidence interval surrounding the mean. Further details can be found in Tables S3 and S4. 
 
Next, we examined judgements of agency and experience. We found that, across characteristics, 
having versus lacking affected both perceptions of agency (Study 1a: F(1, 239) = 739.31, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = 
.75; Study 1b: F(1, 211) = 353.66, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .63) and experience (Study 1a: F(1, 239) = 522.36, p < 
.001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .69; Study 1b: F(1, 211) = 226.64, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .52). Some characteristics shifted perceptions 
of agency more than others (Study 1a: F(12.05, 2879.86) = 41.16, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .15; Study 1b: F(12.14, 
2562.21) = 18.02, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .08). The same was true for perceptions of experience (Study 1a: 
F(12.67, 3027.87) = 76.40, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .24; Study 1b: F(12.22, 2579.01) = 30.67, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .13). 
Planning and spatial reasoning shifted perceptions of agency the most, whilst primary and secondary 
negative emotions shifted perceptions of experience the most. 
Lastly, we explored if the degree to which characteristics affected moral judgements was related 
to perceptions of experience and agency. To do this we analysed the data at the level of the 
characteristic. We examined the difference scores (have-lack) for experience, agency, and moral 
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judgements the most (Study 1a: r(14) = .82, 95% CI [.55, .94], p < .001; Study 1b: r(14) = .62, 95% CI [.17, 
.85], p = .011) whilst agency did not (Study 1a: r(14) = -.21, 95% CI [-.64, .32], p = .467; Study 1b: r(14) = -
.26, 95% CI [-.67, .27], p = .327). The experience-morality relationship was also significantly stronger 
than the agency-morality (Study 1a: Z = 2.97, p = .003; Study 1b: Z = 2.19, p = .026; Steiger, 1980). For 
completeness, we also analysed the relationship between experience and agency across characteristics 
(Study 1a: r(14) = -.34, 95% CI [-.72, .18], p = .193; Study 1b: r(14) = -.27, 95% CI [-.67, .26], p = .315). 
The results from Studies 1a and 1b provide an initial indication of how different animal 
characteristics predict moral beliefs about meat eating. We found largely the same pattern of results 
when measuring judgements in relation to the typical animal (Study 1a) and in absolute terms (Study 
1b). The characteristics that most strongly influenced moral judgements were related to complex 
emotions (secondary positive and negative emotions), socio-morality (morality, empathy, social 
connections) and patiency (negative emotions). Importantly, perceptions of experience predicted the 
relative moral importance across characteristics more so than perceptions of agency. These results 
suggest that shifts in animals’ moral standing are more likely to occur in response to information related 
to, for example, socio-morality because such information cues greater perceptions of experience. 
Study 2 
Study 2 examines whether the cultural status of the animal affects the degree to which different 
characteristics confer moral standing. We test for differences between fictitious animals of which 
participants have no prior knowledge and therefore possess no particular cultural status (as in Studies 
1a and 1b), and real animals which are culturally appropriate to eat (i.e., pigs, sheep, cows, chickens). 
This represents an important extension since food animals are associated with particular cultural and 
normative standards that are not present for other animals (Bastian & Loughnan, 2017; Loughnan & 
Davies, 2019), which may lead people to be unreceptive to new information about their minds (Piazza & 
Loughnan, 2016). Study 2 expands our measures to capture broader prohibitions against harm (e.g., 
wrong to harm the animal) in addition to more specific judgements related to meat eating (e.g., wrong 
to eat the animal). In addition to the predictions outlined in the introduction, we expect that having (vs. 
lacking) characteristics will affect moral judgements related to food animals less than moral judgements 
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Participants & Design 
Sample. Three hundred and eighteen students (278 female; Mage = 19.40, SD = 3.41) from a 
British University participated in exchange for course credit. Participants identified their diet as follows: 
omnivore (n = 272), pescetarian (n = 16), vegetarian (n = 22) and vegan (n = 8).  
Statistical power. A sensitivity analysis conducted via G*Power (n = 318, α = .05, two-tailed) 
suggested that the sample afforded greater than 80% power to detect a small-to-medium main effect 
(ηp
2
have-lack = .02) and two-way interactions (ηp
2
have-lack x characteristic
 = .01, ηp
2
neutral-food x characteristic
 = .01). 
Design. The study followed a 2 (fictitious-neutral vs. real-food) × 2 (have vs. lack) × 16 
(characteristic) mixed design. Participants were randomly assigned to read about an animal that was 
fictitious and culturally neutral or real and associated with food; and had or lacked characteristics 
(between-participants). Participants were presented with a single animal that was described in terms of 
16 characteristics (within-participants). The study adhered to the same ethical guidelines outlined in 
Studies 1a and 1b (see Participants and Design). 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants read about the same characteristics as in Study 1a and 1b with the exception that 
the characteristics referred to a fictitious animal that held no particular cultural status (trablans, kedor, 
bovan, or gera) or an animal that is culturally identified as food (pig, sheep, cow, or chicken). To enhance 
the realism and believability of the experiment we embedded the information within a mock, but 
ostensibly real, scientific article (see Figure S1). Following each characteristic participants judged the 
extent to which the animal had the capacity for eight mental states (thought, self-control, planning, 
remembering, fear, pain, pleasure, suffering). Participants then judged, on two two-item measures, how 
morally wrong it would be, and how guilty they would feel to eat the animal, and to harm the animal, 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Results and Discussion 
Data Preparation 
We approach the data preparation and analysis in the same fashion as in Studies 1a and 1b. The 
four items tapping moral judgements related to meat eating and harm were highly correlated (αs > .88), 
as such, we aggregated across these items. Two factors extracted from the eight mental state items 
accounted for 69-83% and 8-22% of the variance and differentially loaded on items related to agency 
(thought, self-control, planning, remembering) and experience (fear, pain, pleasure, suffering). The 
factors were correlated (rs = .50 - .79). We calculated composite scores for agency (αs >  .95) and 
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Main Analysis 
We conducted an Analysis of Variance with 2 (fictitious-neutral vs. real-food) × 2 (have vs. lack) × 
16 (characteristic) on moral judgements, perceptions of agency, and perceptions of experience. Diet 
(omnivore vs. pescatarian vs. vegetarian vs. vegan) did not qualify any of the central effects, Fs < 1.13, ps 
> .335. 3 As such, we do not consider this factor any further. Animals that were culturally identified as 
food were afforded less moral standing than those that were culturally neutral (Mfood = 4.73, Mneutral = 
5.48), F(1, 314) = 15.74, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .05. Unexpectedly, we found no evidence that the cultural status 
of the animal qualified the central main effect (have vs. lack), F(1, 314) = 0.25, p = .615, 𝜂
𝑝
2 < .01, nor the 
two-way interaction (have vs. lack × characteristic), F(12.27, 3851.74) = 1.31, p = .203, 𝜂
𝑝
2 < .01. As such, 
we focused on the results across both animal types. As in Studies 1a and 1b, animals that had 
characteristics were afforded greater moral standing than those that lacked characteristics, F(1, 314) = 
56.25, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .15, and this was qualified by the characteristic, F(12.27, 3851.74) = 10.23, p < .001, 
𝜂
𝑝
2 = .03. Characteristics associated with socio-morality and patiency most strongly influenced 
judgements of moral standing, whilst characteristics associated with reasoning only weakly influenced 
judgements of moral standing (Figure 2). 
                                                        
3 Empty cells due to small ns in some dietary groups prohibited an Analysis of Variance with 2 (fictitious-neutral 
vs. real-food) × 2 (have vs. lack) × 16 (characteristic) × 5 (diet). Because of this we examined the effects of diet in a 
simpler model with 2 (have vs. lack) × 16 (characteristic) × 5 (diet). This analysis revealed a main effect of diet on 
moral judgement (Momnivore = 4.83, Mpescatarian = 6.57, Mvegetarian = 6.53, Mvegan = 6.96), F(3, 310) = 25.61, p < .001, ηp
2  
= .20, agency (Momnivore = 4.10, Mpescatarian = 3.74, Mvegetarian = 4.63, Mvegan = 5.52), F(3, 310) = 6.71, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .06, 
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Figure 2. Wrongness/guilt associated with eating/harming an animal that lacks (-) and has (+) each 
characteristic, in Study 2. Characteristics are organized from most to least impactful. Figure shows the 
95% bootstrap confidence interval surrounding the mean. Further details can be found in Table S5. 
 
Next, we examined judgements of agency and experience. Animals that were culturally 
identified as food were perceived to possess less agency (Mfood = 3.85, Mneutral = 4.48), F(1, 314) = 5.20, p 
= .023, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .02, but, unexpectedly, no less experience (Mfood = 4.19, Mneutral = 4.44), F(1, 314) = 0.01, p = 
.926, 𝜂
𝑝
2 < .01, compared to culturally neutral animals. Looking across characteristics, having 
characteristics elevated perceptions of agency, F(1, 314) = 941.91, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .75, and experience, 
F(1, 314) = 308.09, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .50. Some characteristics shifted judgements of agency and experience 
more than others, F(11.34, 3562.30) = 39.04, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .11, F(12.18, 3825.92) = 58.05, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = 
.16. We found no evidence that characteristics shifted judgements of agency and experience more for 
food animals compared to neutral animals, F(11.34, 3562.30) = 0.62, p = .818, 𝜂
𝑝
2 < .01, F(12.18, 3825.92) 
= 1.17, p = .300, 𝜂
𝑝
2 < .01. 
Finally, we examined agency, experience, and morality at the level of the characteristic.  We 
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Perceptions of experience closely tracked which characteristics conferred the most (and least) moral 
standing, r(14) = .84, 95% CI [.60, .94], p < .001; whilst perceptions of agency did not, r(14) = -.34, 95% CI 
[-.72, .18], p = .194 (Z = 3.31, p < .001). There was no evidence that the relationship between agency, 
experience and moral standing across characteristics differed for food animals compared to non-food 
animals Zs < 0.89, ps > .372. Finally, there was some weak evidence of a negative relationship between 
experience and agency across characteristics, r(14) = -.48, 95% CI [-.79, .03], p = .062. 
Study 2 replicates and extends our findings. We replicated the findings of Studies 1a and 1b, 
demonstrating that characteristics conferred varying degrees of moral standing. Characteristics 
associated with secondary emotions, socio-morality, and patiency conferred the greatest amount of 
moral standing. Judgements related to morality and mind differed for food animals compared to neutral 
animals. Food animals were afforded less moral standing and agency but no less experience. This is 
somewhat unexpected as experience, more than agency, typically underlies moral standing (H. M. Gray 
et al., 2007). We found little evidence that the cultural status of the animal moderated the effects. This 
latter finding is important because it demonstrates that the findings generalize to real animals that hold 
a particularly relevant cultural status. 
Study 3 
Study 3 conceptually replicates and extends our findings. Here we take a closer look by 
examining a larger set (i = 51) of even more fine-grained characteristics (e.g., can recognise itself in a 
mirror). This allows us to take an important step towards understanding how people interpret concrete 
animal behaviours, by (1) removing interpretive frames from our stimuli (e.g., “…is capable of spatial 
reasoning”), and (2) widening the stimulus set to include a number of concrete behaviours that actual 
animals demonstrate (e.g., de Waal, 2016; Shettleworth, 2001). In doing so, we are able to examine the 
degree to which participants abstract morally relevant information about animal minds from concrete 
behaviours (see also Spence, Osman, & McElligott, 2017). 
Participants & Design 
Sample. Two hundred and ten students (165 female; Mage = 19.38, SD = 1.93) from a British 
University participated in exchange for course credit. Participants identified their diet as follows: 
omnivore (n = 161), pescetarian (n = 16), vegetarian (n = 24) and vegan (n = 9).  
Statistical power. A sensitivity analysis conducted via G*Power (n = 210, α = .05, two-tailed) 
suggested that the sample afforded greater than 80% power to detect a small-to-medium main effect 
(ηp
2
have-lack = .04) and two-way interaction (ηp
2
have-lack x characteristic
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Design. The study followed a 2 (have vs. lack) × 51 (characteristic) mixed design. Participants 
were randomly assigned to read about animals that had or lacked characteristics (between-participants). 
Participants were presented with 51 animals, each described in terms of a single characteristic (within-
participants). The study adhered to the same ethical guidelines outlined in Studies 1a and 1b (see 
Participants and Design). 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants read 51 statements describing various characteristics, many of which were taken 
from the larger excerpts used in Studies 1a, 1b and 2. The full list of the stimuli is available in Table S2. 
Participants were either presented with animals that were capable (e.g., “…can remember which of 
four boxes contains food”) or incapable (e.g., “…cannot remember which of four boxes contains food”). 
Each characteristic was attributed to a fictitious animal. We opted to capture superordinate dimensions 
of mind more directly, by having participants judge the extent to which each animal could think and feel. 
These judgements were made via two single-item measures. Finally, participants judged how morally 
wrong it would be to eat the animal. All measures were anchored from -3 (much less than a typical 
animal) to +3 (much greater than a typical animal). 
Results and Discussion 
Data preparation 
We analysed the single-items measures of thinking, feeling, and moral wrongness. Judgements 
of thinking and feeling were correlated (rs  = .16 - .72). 
Main Analysis 
We conducted an Analysis of Variance with 2 (have vs. lack) × 51 (characteristic) on moral 
judgements, perceptions of agency, and perceptions of experience. Including diet (omnivore vs. 
pescatarian vs. vegetarian vs. vegan) in these models did not qualify any of the central effects, Fs < 2.59, 
ps > .054. 4 We therefore do not consider this factor any further. We found that animals that had 
(vs. lacked) characteristics were less permissible to eat, F(1, 208) = 68.78, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .25. We again 
found that some characteristics more strongly affected moral judgements than others, F(24.57, 5111.31) 
= 6.95, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .03. Focusing on these differences showed that sharing food, pain and suffering 
were amongst the most important characteristics for judging whether or not it was permissible to eat an 
                                                        
4 This analysis revealed a main effect of diet on moral judgement (Momnivore = 0.19, Mpescatarian = 0.00, Mvegetarian = 
0.85, Mvegan = 0.28), F(3, 202) = 3.25, p = .023, ηp
2
 = .05, and experience (Momnivore = 0.01, Mpescatarian = -0.25, 
Mvegetarian = 0.70, Mvegan = 0.16), F(3, 202) = 4.07, p = .008, ηp
2
 = .06, but not agency (Momnivore = 0.03, Mpescatarian = -
0.19, Mvegetarian = 0.48, Mvegan = 0.14), F(3, 202) = 1.20, p = .309, ηp
2
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animal, whereas calmness, understanding new objects and mimicking yawns were amongst the least 
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Figure 3. Wrongness of eating an animal that lacks (-) and has (+) each characteristic, in Study 3. 
Characteristics are organized from most to least impactful. Figure shows the 95% bootstrap confidence 
interval surrounding the mean. Further details can be found in Table S6. 
 
Turning to judgements of thinking and feeling, people again attributed greater capacity to think, 
F(1, 208) = 303.74, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .59, and feel, F(1, 208) = 382.92, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .65, to animals that had 
versus lacked characteristics. Similarly, some characteristics were more central drivers of these 
judgements than others, F(22.93, 4769.56) = 15.30, p < .001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .07, F(21.53, 4477.70) = 27.14, p < 
.001, 𝜂
𝑝
2 = .12. For example, remembering mazes and using boxes as tools more strongly affected 
perceptions of the animals’ capacity to think, whilst suffering and sadness more strongly affected 
judgements related to feeling (further descriptive statistics can be found in Table S6). 
Finally, we explored judgements of thinking, feeling, and morality at the level of the 
characteristic. To do this we analysed difference scores between animals described as having and lacking 
each characteristic. Perceptions of the capacity to feel closely predicted which characteristics were most 
(and least) important for moral judgements, r(49) = .56, 95% CI [.34, .72], p < .001, whilst perceptions of 
the capacity to think did not, r(49) = .22, 95% CI [-.06, .47], p = .124; although there was no strong 
evidence that these effects differed, Z = 1.72, p = .086. There was some evidence of a negative 
relationship between perceptions of the capacity to think and feel across characteristics, r(49) = -.31, 
95% CI [-.54, -.04], p = .026. 
The results from Study 3 corroborate our findings, suggesting that moral judgements about 
meat eating are most sensitive to secondary emotions (e.g., love), socio-morality (e.g., sharing food) and 
patiency (e.g., pain). As expected, beliefs about the capacity for feeling (as opposed to thinking) largely 
accounted for the relative impact of each characteristic on moral beliefs. Importantly, these results 
demonstrate that information about concrete behaviours inform moral judgements about meat eating. 
General Discussion 
Four studies documented how and why different characteristics shifted moral judgements 
related to animals with varying cultural status. We found considerable heterogeneity in the degree to 
which different characteristics conferred moral standing. Descriptively, the most morally important 
characteristics were related to experience, secondary emotions, socio-morality, and moral patiency. We 
found that the relative moral importance of each characteristic was related to representations of 
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participants had no prior knowledge and animals that are culturally defined as food—a point we return 
to later.  
The findings support various theoretical stances and highlight fine-grained distinctions between 
different animal characteristics. The results suggest that experience (K. Gray et al., 2012), secondary 
emotions (Demoulin et al., 2004; Leyens et al., 2001), socio-morality (Piazza et al., 2014; Haslam & 
Loughnan, 2014) and moral patiency (K. Gray et al., 2012) are strong drivers of animals’ moral standing. 
In all four studies we found that animals that had the capacity to feel secondary emotions (e.g., love, 
nostalgia), understand morality (e.g., sharing food with others), empathize with others (e.g., feeling 
others pain), form social bonds (e.g., looking for deceased family members), and feel negative emotions 
(e.g., pain, suffering) were consistently perceived to be more wrong to eat than animals that had other 
capacities. These results (especially those from Study 3) help move towards a more comprehensive 
understanding of how novel information about animals shifts moral judgement. 
The findings point to why some characteristics shifted moral judgements more than others. 
Shifts in moral judgements across characteristics were closely related to shifts in superordinate 
representations of experience/feeling but not agency/thinking, suggesting that novel information is 
likely to affect moral judgement to the degree that it affects superordinate perceptions of animals’ 
capacity for experience/feeling. This supports the idea that moral standing flows from perceptions of 
experience more so than agency (H. M. Gray et al., 2007; K. Gray et al., 2012; cf. Sytsma & Machery, 
2012). That said, the findings also point to the importance of benevolence/harmfulness (Piazza et al., 
2014)--also captured by Weisman et al.’s (2017) ‘heart’ dimension. For example, animals that felt love 
and shared food with others were amongst the most wrong to eat, suggesting that moral standing likely 
also follows from superordinate beliefs about benevolence/harmfulness (Piazza et al., 2014). Finally, it is 
worth noting that other characteristics and superordinate dimensions that we did not measure may be 
equally important as experience/feeling and benevolence/harmfulness (e.g., seeing, having free will; 
Weisman et al., 2017). It remains for future research to examine how other characteristics and 
superordinate dimensions are related to moral standing in animals. 
We measured moral beliefs about eating and harming animals. These beliefs reflect important 
concerns related to the treatment of animals and are indications of animals’ moral standing (Bastian & 
Loughnan, 2017; Goodwin, 2015). Different patterns may arise for other moral beliefs. Recent work has 
shown that ascribing cognitive capacities to entities shifts beliefs about harming the entity for 
instrumental reasons but not for moral reasons (Rai, Valdesolo & Graham, 2017). These data suggest 
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morally necessary to harm animals (e.g., in cases of culling). Given the multitude of ways in which 
humans engage with animals, it seems pertinent to be cautious when generalising the findings. 
The present findings provide a potentially useful tool for research on human-animal relations. 
We went to considerable lengths to include a large sample of actual animal behaviours (e.g., de Waal, 
2016; Shettleworth, 2001) and theoretically relevant capacities (e.g., Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). We 
provide full information on all our stimuli and data so that others can utilize them (see Tables S1-S6). We 
hope this will prove useful to those interested in studying moral judgement and mind attribution in 
animals.  
Lastly, the findings suggest that moral judgements are sensitive to information about animal 
minds even when related to animals that are typically reared for food. This finding may have practical 
implications for researchers interested in shifting how people think about meat consumption and animal 
minds. Applied approaches often assume that providing novel information about food animals’ mental 
capacities will shift moral beliefs. Moreover, advocates often put information about animal suffering 
front and centre to prompt people to consider their meat consumption (Packwood-Freeman, 2010). Our 
results support these intuitions, suggesting that beliefs are affected by these messages and that the 
strongest messages likely include information related to pain and suffering. However, our results also 
highlight some characteristics that are perhaps less commonly assumed to confer moral standing in 
animals; for example, sociability and morality (see Piazza et al., 2014).  
In sum, across four studies we investigated how information related to mental traits and 
behaviours informed moral judgement related to eating animals. The results revealed fine-grained 
distinctions and suggest that information related to secondary emotions, socio-morality and patiency 
affect moral judgements most strongly. The data support an established perspective on mind perception 
by confirming that the relative moral importance of each characteristic was driven by the degree to 
which it suggests an animal was capable of experience (feeling) or agency (thinking). Taken together, the 
findings help move towards a more complete understanding of mind perception in animals and 
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